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o·f P·etition for Writ o.f Revie-w
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents are in general agreement with the Statement of Facts set forth in the brief of petitioner. However, some amplification is necessary.
In Public Service Commission Case 4252 - Sub 2,
. .\pplicant \"Vycoff Company, Incorporated (hereinafter
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referred to as Wycoff), stated at the hearing before the
Commission that it ''would like to propose a restrictive
stipulation as to the application before the Commission.''
(R. 1099) The proposed stipulation was presented, discussed and agreed to by Wycoff and certain protestants.
(R. 1099-1106) The stipulation was reduced to writing
by the applicant and the certain protestants (R. 1828-29),
filed with, and accepted by, the Commission. (R. 1107)
The stipulation provided in part as follows:
'' 2. Applicant shall amend its application by restricting the scope thereof in the following particulars:
a. The application shall be limited to the
transportation of shipments of not to exceed 100
pounds upon a weight basis. Shipments shall not
be separated for the purpose of avoiding this restriction." (R. 1828)
In the Report and Order of the Public Service Commission, in Case No. 4252 - Sub 2, issued January 21,
1958, the aforementioned stipulation was included in paragraph 4 of the Findings of Fact and reads as follows:
"4. Forty-two witnesses testified on behalf of applicant and one hundred and two on behalf of the
protestants. During the hearing and before the
bus lines has concluded the presentation of their
evidence the following stipulation '""as entered into
between applicant and the protesting truck line
carriers:
1. This stipulation is subject to the approval
and acceptance by the Public Service Commission of Utah.
2
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2. Applicant shall amend its application by
restricting the scope thereof in the following
particulars :
a. The applicant shall be limited to the
transportation of shipments of not to exceed 100 pounds upon a weight basis. Shipments shall not be separated for the purpose of a voiding this restriction.
b. Applicant shall not transport in excess of 500 pounds on a weight basis of
such express shipments on any one schedule each way operating over the routes
and departing at the times set forth in
Exhibit 2 in this proceeding, except that
applicant shall be permitted to transport
not to exceed 1500 pounds on a weight
basis of such express shipments from Ogden to Salt Lake City upon one of its
schedules each day.
c. The schedules referred to above shall
coincide with the movements of the Deseret News newspapers and The Salt Lake
Tribune newspapers as shown in Exhibit
2, and one United States mail schedule
moving north from Salt Lake City and the
return of all such schedules to Salt Lake
City.
d. In determining the maximum weight
limitation on any one schedule, all shipments shall be aggregated regardless of
point of origin or destination.
e. Applicant shall not carry expess shipments of the commodities sought by the
application on northbound schedules fom
Salt Lake City or southbound schedules
from points north to Salt Lake City except on those four daily schedules each
3
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way designated on said Exhibit 2 as
Schedules 2, 3, 4 and 5 and 2A, 3A, 4A, and
5A respectively of Table 8 thereof.
f. "Shipment" as used herein shall refer
to commodities moving on a single bill
of lading from one consignor to one
consignee.
3. In consideration of the Commission accepting the aforestated restrictive amendment to the application, the named truck line
protestants do hereby withdraw their opposition to the application and their protests
stated thereon.
Said stipulation was approved by the Commission." (R. 1871) (Emphasis added)
In its Conclusion in the same case, the Commission
states:
''CONCLUSION
From the foregoing facts the Commission
concludes that public convenience and necessity
justify the granting of the certificate applied for
within the limitations specified in the stipulation
set forth m the foregoing findings.'' (R. 1878)
(Emphasis added)
In its Order in the same case, restriction ''a'' reads:
"a. Applicant shall be limited to the transportation of items of not to exceed 100 pounds upon a
weight basis. Shipments 'vill not be separated for
the purpose of avoiding this restriction.'' (R.
1878) (Emphasis added)
In the 1958 case of Lake Shore Motor Coach Lines,
Inc., et al. v. HaZ S. Bennett, et al., 8 Utah 2d 293, 333 P.2d
4
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1061, this ( \nnt set aside the foregoing order "insofar

as it affects the territory served by plaintiffs * * *.''
On February 3, 1959, the Public Service Commission
issued an amended order in P. S.C. Case No. 4252- Sub
~'

in conformance with the decision of this Court in the

/jake Shore J.lf otor Coach Lines case, supra.

On December 21, 1959, a nunc pro tunc order was
issued by the Public Service Commission correcting the
orders of January 21, 1958, and February 3, 1959, in
P. S. C. Case No. 4252 - Sub 2, so that the word ''items''
as used in restriction a. therein should read ''shipments''
and thus reflect the purpose and intent of the Commission
in approving the stipulation referred to herein. (R. 1-2)
(R. 19-20). But for the inadvertent use of the word

''items'' in place of ''shipments,'' the restrictions set
forth in the orders of January 21, 1958, and February 3,
1959, are in all rna terial respects identical with the stip-

ulation referred to herein, although the latter order contains a modification reflecting the opinion of this Court
in the Lake Shore Motor Coach Lines decision, supra.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
PoiNT

I.

THE COMMISSION HAD AUTHORITY TO, AND
DID NOT ERR IN, ISSUING ITS NUNC PRO
TUNC ORDER IN THIS MATTER.
5

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

PoiNT

II.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONER WERE NOT DENIED THROUGH
THE ISSUANCE OF THE NUNC PRO TUNC ORDER IN THIS MATTER.
ARGUMENT
PoiNT

I.

THE COMMISSION HAD AUTHORITY TO, AND
DID NOT ERR IN, ISSUING ITS NUNC PRO
TUNC ORDER IN THIS MATTER.
It is a general rule of law that" all courts have inherent power, independent of statute, to correct clerical erors, at any time, and to make the judgment entry correspond with the judgment rendered.'' 1 Freeman on Judgments, Fifth Edition, p. 281. This principle serves the
ends of essential justice, and is based upon sound public
policy.
According to 30A American Jurisprudence, J udgments, p. 581 :
''The furtherance of a justice is the principal reason for the correction by a court of clerical errors
in the records of its judgments, and for the entry
of such correction nunc pro tunc, especially where
the failure to make the nunc pro tunc entry would
result in injustice arising from an act of the court.
In such case, the judgment nunc pro tunc simply
consummates what the court adjudged but imperfectly performed. * * * '''
6
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/)al'is

v. Rudolph, ('f al. (Calif.) 181 P.2d 765, holds:
"It is well settled that clerical errors in a judgment, where they are shown by the record, may be
corrected at any time, so as to make the judgment
entry correspond with the judgment rendered.
S\vain v. N aglee, 19 Cal. 127 ; Freeman on J udm.,
§§70, 71. And this may be done even after an
appeal and affirmance of the judgment. Rousset
v. Boyle, 45 Cal. 64."

By analogy administrative tribunals possess inherent power to correct clerical errors at any time and to
make the judgment entry correspond with the judgment
rendered. A contrary rule would deny agencies of government authority to correct error and injustice and run
counter to the public interest. According to 42 American
Jurisprudence, Public Administrative Law, p. 537-8,
'' * * * administrative authorities have power to correct
clerical errors in their determination, and to reconsider
or modify them on the ground of fraud or imposition, mistake, surprise, inadvertence, or newly discovered evidence, or to meet changed conditions, whether by reason
of express statutory provisions granting the power of
revision or by reason of principles applied by the courts.''
Thus in the early case of Bell v. Hearne, 19 Howard
252, the Supreme Court of the United States held that
the general land office may cancel a patent erroneously
issued in the name of one James Bell, and issue one in
the name of John Bell. The court stated :

'' * * * The question then arises, had the commissioner of the general land office authority to receive from John Bell the patent erroneously issued
7
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in the name of James Bell, and to issue one in the
proper name of the purchaser~ And the question,
in our opinion, is exceedingly clear. The commissioner of the general land office exercises a general superintendence over the subordinate officers
of his department, and is clothed with liberal powers of control, to be exercised for the purposes of
justice, and to prevent the consequences of inadvertance, irregularity, mistake, and fraud, in the
important and extensive operations of that officer
for the disposal of the public domain. The power
exercised in this case is a power to correct a clerical mistake, the existence of which is shown plainly
by the record, and is a necessary power in the administration of every department. * * * ''
In Hamer et al. v. Industrial Commission, et al.,
(Ariz.), 31 P. 2d 103, the court considered the question of
whether the State Industrial Commission could issue a
nunc pro tunc order, modifying the terms of an award
and order, by changing the words "totally dependent"
to ''partially dependent.'' The court held :
"The first question is whether the award of July
6th as amended and corrected on September 18th is
properly before us and its effect. Petitioners contend that the Industrial Commission had no power
to set aside the award of July 6th and enter a new
award except upon the application of an interested party within t\Yenty days after its entry.
This contention is perhaps correct, as we understand it, but the order entered on September 18th
shows upon its face that it is not an award, but a
correction of the record to show the award actually
made on July 6th. It recites that the a'Yard of
July 6th was to the parents as partial dependents,
whereas it was erroneously made to read total dependents. In truth it 'vas merely entering now
8

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(September 18th) the award that was actually
made (then) July 6th. We know of no reason why
the commission should not have the power and
right to make its records speak the truth. In Zagar
v. Industrial Commission, 40 Ariz. 479, 14 P. (2d)
472, we held that the commission had continuing
power 'to alter, amend, or rescind its awards,' and
this certainly would carry the right to correct its
records to make them conform to its actual findings and to speak the truth. The nunc pro tunc
order of September 18th, being merely the correction of a record to make it speak the truth as it
existed on July 6th, we think is properly before the
court and should be considered in the determination of the award as to amount as also duration.''
See also 42 American Juris prudence, Public Administrative Law, Sec. 174, and cases cited therein.
We therefore submit that the Public Service Commission has inherent power to correct clerical errors at
any time and to make its orders correspond with the decision rendered, and thus speak the truth.
The question then becomes, What is a clerical error~
1 Freeman on Judgments, Fifth Edition, pages 283-284,
defines the term as follows :
" 'Clerical errors' as used in this connection ordinarily relate to the errors or omissions of the clerk
in the entry of the judgment and are sometimes defined or treated as though this were the only class
of cases to "Thich the term might be properly applied. But 'clerical' is employed in a broad sense
as contra-distinguished from 'judicial' error and
covers all errors, mistakes, or omissions which are
not the result of the exercise of the judicial funcSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tion. In other words, the distinction does not depend so much upon the person making the error
as upon whether it was the deliberate result of
judicial reasoning and determination, regardless
of whether it was made by the clerk, by counsel or
by the judge. Mistakes of the court are not necessarily judicial error. Thus, if the judgment or
some provision in it was the result of inadvertence,
as where the court was laboring under a mistake
or misapprehension as to the state of the record
or as to some extrinsic fact, but for which a different judgment would have been rendered, the
judgment may be vacated or may be corrected to
correspond with what it would have been but for
the inadvertence or mistake.''
14 C. J. S., Clerical, p. 1202, sub voce Clerical error,
sets forth this definition:
''Clerical error. An error committed in the performance of clerical work, no matter by whom committed; more specifically, a mistake in copying or
writing; a mistake which naturally excludes any
idea that its insertion was made in the exercise of
any judgment or discretion, or in pursuance of any
determination; an error made by a clerk in transcribing, or otherwise, which must be apparent on
the face of the record, and capable of being corrected by reference to the record only. It has been
said that a clerical error exists when without evident intention one word is written for another,
when the statement of some detail is omitted the
lack of which is not a cause of nullity, or 'vhen
there are mistakes in proper names or amounts
made in copying, which do not change the general
sense of a record, and that it implies negligence
or carelessness.''
10
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School Dist. No. 95 v. Marion County School Reorg.
Committee (Kart.) 208 P. 2d 226, considers the foregoing
definition more narrow in certain respects than courts
have held.
Nevertheless, reference to the record will show that
the appearance of "items" in restriction a. in the original order of J a.nua.ry 21, 1958, and Amendment of February 3, 1959, was a clerical error, the result of inadvertence. This is based upon the following:
(a) The stipulation of Wycoff and its amended application (R. 1828-29) use the word "shipments" in paragraph 2a. thereof.
(b) The Commission approved the stipulation and
the application of Wycoff was thus restricted, (R. 1871);
the word ''shipments'' appears in the Commission's Findings of Fact, in paragraph 4, a reproduction of the stipulation. (R. 1871)
(c) The Conclusion of the Commission was that a
certificate be granted" Within the limitations specified in

the stipulation set forth in the foregoing findings." (Empha.s added) (R. 1878) Both the Stipulation and Findings as pointed out use the word ''shipments'' not

''items.''
(d) Nothing in the record justifies the use of the
word ''items'' in restriction a. of the January 21, 1958,
Order and the February 3, 1959, Amendment.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(e) The Public Service Commission in the nunc pro
tunc order in question stated that the use of the words
''items'' was erroneous and contrary to the purpose and
intent of the Commission, and the word should have been
''shipments.''
· In stating that the word "items" in restriction a. of
the orders in question was the result of inadvertence is not
to··concede petitioner's interpretation of the orders. Restriction a. reads :
''a. Applicant shall be limited to the transportation of items of not to exceed 100 pounds upon a
weight basis. Shipments shall not be separated for
the purpose of avoiding this restriction.''
Now what is the restriction referred to in the foregoing paragraph~ The only prohibition that gives meaning to the ''restriction'' of separating shipments is that
of restricting an aggregate of items (shipment) to 100
pounds. Petitioner's construction of the foregoing restriction renders the second sentence thereof a nullity,
for we understand petitioner argues for a restriction of
100 pounds to a single item. The entire order of January
21, 1958, and the amendment of February 3, 1959, make
sense only if '' i terns '' as used in restriction a. thereof is
synonymous with ''shipments.''
However, the definition of the word' 'items'' is irrelevant. The word crept into restriction a. of the P. S. C.
Order of January 21, 1958, through inadvertence; the
amendment of February 3, 1959, erroneously reproduced
12
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the same defect. The error may be corrected, and was corrected, by the nunc pro tunc order.
PoiNT

II.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONER WERE NOT DENIED THROUGH
THE ISSUANCE OF THE NUNC PRO TUNC ORDER IN THIS MATTER.
We note with some amazement the argument of petitioner that it has been deprived of its constitutional rights
and that the Commission is estopped from entering the
nunc pro tunc order in question. With equal awe we note
the ease with which petitioner sluffs off the question of
estoppel on the part of Wycoff. Petitioner cannot press
this approach without having tongue in cheek.
Who proposed the stipulation upon which the Commission based its

conclusion~

Wycoff. (R. 1099)

Who proposed that its application be amended and
restricted in accordance with the

stipulation~

Wycoff.

(R. 1099; 1828-1829)
Who co-authored, or approved of the use of, the
word "shipments" in the

stipulation~

Wycoff. (R. 1828-

1829)
Who agreed that its'' shipments'' would be limited to
not to exceed 100 pounds on a weight

basis~

Wycoff.

(R. 1828-1829)

13
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Who had notice of the Findings of Fact and Conclusion of the Commission in P. S. C. Case 4252 - Sub 2f
Wycoff.
How can Wycoff in good faith claim that the nunc pro
tunc order denies it any property right, when the order
in effect answers the prayer of Wycoff, and embraces the
agreement of the petitionerf Wycoff was a participant in
proposing, and agreeing to, the restricted scope of its
application; it knew the Commission had approved the
stipulation and it was the intent of the Commission to
enter an order in conformity with the stipulation. We
submit that Wycoff is not only estopped from pressing
a,deprivation of due process argument, but that all prop.er~y rights to which it is entitled and for which it prayed,
are secured through the nunc pro tunc order.
Wycoff takes some comfort in the fact that Public
Service Commission Order 4252 - Sub 2, has been considered by this Court in D.ake Shore Motor Coach Lines,
Inc. et a.Z. v. Hal S. Bennett, et al., 8 U.2d 293, 333 P.2d
1061, between the time of the issuance of the original order
and the nunc pro tunc entry.
We submit that such review by this Court does not
prohibit the Commission from entering its nunc pro tunc
order. As set forth herein the correction of clerical errors
may be made at any time, 1 Freeman, Judgments, Fifth
Edition, p. 281 ; furthermore, the scope of the review
'proceedings in the Lake Shore JJ1otor Coach Lines decision, supra, involved the P. S. C. order only as it affected
the plaintiffs and the areas they serve; this Court did

14
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not consider the order as it related to Wycoff and those
protestants who entered into the stipulation. If anything, the Court recognized that the application of Wycoff
was "to haul commodities generally in shipments up to
100 pounds'' and noted the Wycoff stipulation as filed
with the Commission.
To grant the petition of Wycoff in the matter before
this Court would make an absolute mockery out of the
Wycoff stipulation and the intent of the Public. Service
Commission in approving the stipulation; it would make
the rule permitting the correction of clerical errors a
nullity. To allow Wycoff to capitalize on an inadvertent
act of the Commission would foster injustice, redound to
the distinterest of the public, and strip an administrative
agency of the power to do justice and make its orders
speak the truth.
CONCLUSION
The petition of Wycoff Company, Incorporated,
should be denied.
Respectfully submitted
WALTER L. BUDGE
Attorney General
RAYMOND W. GEE
Deputy Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondents
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